package/network/utils/curl/patches/105-CVE-2017-8816.patch

   1 From 7947c50bcd09cf471c95511739bc66d2cb506ee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
   2 From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
   3 Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2017 23:51:52 +0100
   4 Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: avoid integer overflow for malloc size
   5
   6 Reported-by: Alex Nichols
   7 Assisted-by: Kamil Dudka and Max Dymond
   8
   9 CVE-2017-8816
  10
  11 Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2017-11e7.html
  12 ---
  13  lib/curl_ntlm_core.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
  14  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
  15
  16 diff --git a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
  17 index 1309bf0d9..e8962769c 100644
  18 --- a/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
  19 +++ b/lib/curl_ntlm_core.c
  20 @@ -616,23 +616,42 @@ CURLcode Curl_hmac_md5(const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen,
  21    Curl_HMAC_final(ctxt, output);
  22
  23    return CURLE_OK;
  24  }
  25
  26 +#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
  27 +/* some limits.h headers have this defined, some don't */
  28 +#if defined(_LP64) || defined(_I32LPx)
  29 +#define SIZE_T_MAX 18446744073709551615U
  30 +#else
  31 +#define SIZE_T_MAX 4294967295U
  32 +#endif
  33 +#endif
  34 +
  35  /* This creates the NTLMv2 hash by using NTLM hash as the key and Unicode
  36   * (uppercase UserName + Domain) as the data
  37   */
  38  CURLcode Curl_ntlm_core_mk_ntlmv2_hash(const char *user, size_t userlen,
  39                                         const char *domain, size_t domlen,
  40                                         unsigned char *ntlmhash,
  41                                         unsigned char *ntlmv2hash)
  42  {
  43    /* Unicode representation */
  44 -  size_t identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2;
  45 -  unsigned char *identity = malloc(identity_len);
  46 +  size_t identity_len;
  47 +  unsigned char *identity;
  48    CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
  49
  50 +  /* we do the length checks below separately to avoid integer overflow risk
  51 +     on extreme data lengths */
  52 +  if((userlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) ||
  53 +     (domlen > SIZE_T_MAX/2) ||
  54 +     ((userlen + domlen) > SIZE_T_MAX/2))
  55 +    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
  56 +
  57 +  identity_len = (userlen + domlen) * 2;
  58 +  identity = malloc(identity_len);
  59 +
  60    if(!identity)
  61      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
  62
  63    ascii_uppercase_to_unicode_le(identity, user, userlen);
  64    ascii_to_unicode_le(identity + (userlen << 1), domain, domlen);
  65 --
  66 2.15.0
  67