include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
PKG_NAME:=openssh
-PKG_VERSION:=7.9p1
-PKG_RELEASE:=7
+PKG_VERSION:=8.0p1
+PKG_RELEASE:=1
PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/ \
https://ftp.spline.de/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/ \
https://anorien.csc.warwick.ac.uk/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/
-PKG_HASH:=6b4b3ba2253d84ed3771c8050728d597c91cfce898713beb7b64a305b6f11aad
+PKG_HASH:=bd943879e69498e8031eb6b7f44d08cdc37d59a7ab689aa0b437320c3481fd68
PKG_LICENSE:=BSD ISC
PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENCE
define Package/openssh-sftp-server
$(call Package/openssh/Default)
TITLE+= SFTP server
- # Strip dependencies to avoid pulling in OpenSSL etc.
- DEPENDS:=
endef
define Package/openssh-sftp-server/description
endif
define Build/Compile
- $(MAKE) -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) \
- DESTDIR="$(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)" \
- LIBS="" \
- sftp-server
$(MAKE) -C $(PKG_BUILD_DIR) \
DESTDIR="$(PKG_INSTALL_DIR)" \
STRIP_OPT="" \
+++ /dev/null
-From 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 03:03:10 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer
- to the
-
-current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
----
- scp.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 60682c687..4f3fdcd3d 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.197 2018/06/01 04:31:48 dtucker Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.198 2018/11/16 03:03:10 djm Exp $ */
- /*
- * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
- * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
-@@ -1106,7 +1106,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- SCREWUP("size out of range");
- size = (off_t)ull;
-
-- if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) {
-+ if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
-+ strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
- run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
- exit(1);
- }
+++ /dev/null
-From 5e021158aa22cc64da4fca1618ee0bfd2d031049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 02:43:56 +0000
-Subject: upstream: fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
-
-PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were
-specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor
-checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against
-*AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=cd9467318b56e6e93ff9575c906ff8350af9b8a2
-Last-Update: 2019-02-28
-
-Patch-Name: fix-key-type-check.patch
----
- monitor.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 08fddabd7..037d6d333 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -892,6 +892,35 @@ mm_answer_authrole(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- return (0);
- }
-
-+/*
-+ * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
-+ * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
-+ * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
-+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
-+ */
-+static int
-+key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
-+ const char *list)
-+{
-+ char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
-+ int found = 0;
-+
-+ l = ol;
-+ for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
-+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
-+ found = 1;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (!found) {
-+ error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
-+ sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
-+ }
-+
-+ free(ol);
-+ return found;
-+}
-+
- int
- mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- {
-@@ -1197,8 +1226,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- break;
- if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
- break;
-- if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-- options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1)
-+ if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
-+ options.pubkey_key_types))
- break;
- allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
- pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
-@@ -1209,8 +1238,8 @@ mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
- break;
- if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
- break;
-- if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
-- options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1)
-+ if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
-+ options.hostbased_key_types))
- break;
- allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
+++ /dev/null
-From d94226d4fcefbc398c5583e12b5d07ca33884ba4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu, 27 Dec 2018 23:02:11 +0000
-Subject: upstream: Request RSA-SHA2 signatures for
-
-rsa-sha2-{256|512}-cert-v01@openssh.com cert algorithms; ok markus@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afc6f7ca216ccd821656d1c911d2a3deed685033
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=f429c1b2ef631f2855e51a790cf71761d752bbca
-Bug: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2944
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/923419
-Last-Update: 2019-02-28
-
-Patch-Name: request-rsa-sha2-cert-signatures.patch
----
- authfd.c | 8 +++++---
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
-index ecdd869ab..62cbf8c19 100644
---- a/authfd.c
-+++ b/authfd.c
-@@ -327,10 +327,12 @@ ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
- static u_int
- agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
- {
-- if (alg != NULL && key->type == KEY_RSA) {
-- if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0)
-+ if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
-+ if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 ||
-+ strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
- return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
-- else if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0)
-+ if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 ||
-+ strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
- return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
- }
- return 0;
+++ /dev/null
-From 11b88754cadcad0ba79b4ffcc127223248dccb54 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed, 23 Jan 2019 08:01:46 +0000
-Subject: upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move
-
-the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
-atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm
-and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
-
-CVE-2019-6109
-
-Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/793412
-Last-Update: 2019-02-08
-
-Patch-Name: sanitize-scp-filenames-via-snmprintf.patch
----
- atomicio.c | 20 ++++++++++++++-----
- progressmeter.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
- progressmeter.h | 3 ++-
- scp.c | 1 +
- sftp-client.c | 16 ++++++++-------
- 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/atomicio.c b/atomicio.c
-index f854a06f5..d91bd7621 100644
---- a/atomicio.c
-+++ b/atomicio.c
-@@ -65,9 +65,14 @@ atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
- res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
- switch (res) {
- case -1:
-- if (errno == EINTR)
-+ if (errno == EINTR) {
-+ /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
-+ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
-+ errno = EINTR;
-+ return pos;
-+ }
- continue;
-- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-+ } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
- #ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
- #endif
-@@ -122,9 +127,14 @@ atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
- res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
- switch (res) {
- case -1:
-- if (errno == EINTR)
-+ if (errno == EINTR) {
-+ /* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
-+ if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
-+ errno = EINTR;
-+ return pos;
-+ }
- continue;
-- if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
-+ } else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
- #ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
- (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
- #endif
-diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
-index fe9bf52e4..add462dde 100644
---- a/progressmeter.c
-+++ b/progressmeter.c
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
-
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include <time.h>
-@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@
- #include "progressmeter.h"
- #include "atomicio.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "utf8.h"
-
- #define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
- #define MAX_WINSIZE 512
-@@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ static void setscreensize(void);
- void refresh_progress_meter(void);
-
- /* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
--static void update_progress_meter(int);
-+static void sig_alarm(int);
-
- static double start; /* start progress */
- static double last_update; /* last progress update */
-@@ -74,6 +76,7 @@ static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */
- static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */
- static int win_size; /* terminal window size */
- static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
-+static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired;
-
- /* units for format_size */
- static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
-@@ -126,9 +129,17 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
- off_t bytes_left;
- int cur_speed;
- int hours, minutes, seconds;
-- int i, len;
- int file_len;
-
-+ if ((!alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
-+ return;
-+ alarm_fired = 0;
-+
-+ if (win_resized) {
-+ setscreensize();
-+ win_resized = 0;
-+ }
-+
- transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
- cur_pos = *counter;
- now = monotime_double();
-@@ -158,16 +169,11 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
-
- /* filename */
- buf[0] = '\0';
-- file_len = win_size - 35;
-+ file_len = win_size - 36;
- if (file_len > 0) {
-- len = snprintf(buf, file_len + 1, "\r%s", file);
-- if (len < 0)
-- len = 0;
-- if (len >= file_len + 1)
-- len = file_len;
-- for (i = len; i < file_len; i++)
-- buf[i] = ' ';
-- buf[file_len] = '\0';
-+ buf[0] = '\r';
-+ snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1 , &file_len, "%*s",
-+ file_len * -1, file);
- }
-
- /* percent of transfer done */
-@@ -228,22 +234,11 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
-
- /*ARGSUSED*/
- static void
--update_progress_meter(int ignore)
-+sig_alarm(int ignore)
- {
-- int save_errno;
--
-- save_errno = errno;
--
-- if (win_resized) {
-- setscreensize();
-- win_resized = 0;
-- }
-- if (can_output())
-- refresh_progress_meter();
--
-- signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
-+ signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
-+ alarm_fired = 1;
- alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
-- errno = save_errno;
- }
-
- void
-@@ -259,10 +254,9 @@ start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
- bytes_per_second = 0;
-
- setscreensize();
-- if (can_output())
-- refresh_progress_meter();
-+ refresh_progress_meter();
-
-- signal(SIGALRM, update_progress_meter);
-+ signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
- signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
- alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
- }
-@@ -286,6 +280,7 @@ stop_progress_meter(void)
- static void
- sig_winch(int sig)
- {
-+ signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
- win_resized = 1;
- }
-
-diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
-index bf179dca6..8f6678060 100644
---- a/progressmeter.h
-+++ b/progressmeter.h
-@@ -24,4 +24,5 @@
- */
-
- void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
-+void refresh_progress_meter(void);
- void stop_progress_meter(void);
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 7163d33dc..80308573c 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
- off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
-
- *cnt += s;
-+ refresh_progress_meter();
- if (limit_kbps > 0)
- bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
- return 0;
-diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 4986d6d8d..2bc698f86 100644
---- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -101,7 +101,9 @@ sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
- {
- struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
-
-- bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
-+ refresh_progress_meter();
-+ if (bwlimit != NULL)
-+ bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
- return 0;
- }
-
-@@ -121,8 +123,8 @@ send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
- iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m);
- iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m);
-
-- if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2,
-- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) !=
-+ if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio,
-+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) !=
- sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
- fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
-
-@@ -138,8 +140,8 @@ get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
-
- if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-- if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4,
-- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) {
-+ if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio,
-+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) {
- if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET)
- fatal("Connection closed");
- else
-@@ -157,8 +159,8 @@ get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
-
- if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-- if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len,
-- conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in)
-+ if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio,
-+ conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL)
- != msg_len) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- fatal("Connection closed");
+++ /dev/null
-From 2a8f710447442e9a03e71c022859112ec2d77d17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu, 24 Jan 2019 16:52:17 +0000
-Subject: upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and
-
-end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
-transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb
-Last-Update: 2019-02-08
-
-Patch-Name: have-progressmeter-force-update-at-beginning-and-end-transfer.patch
----
- progressmeter.c | 13 +++++--------
- progressmeter.h | 4 ++--
- scp.c | 2 +-
- sftp-client.c | 2 +-
- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
-index add462dde..e385c1254 100644
---- a/progressmeter.c
-+++ b/progressmeter.c
-@@ -59,9 +59,6 @@ static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
- static void sig_winch(int);
- static void setscreensize(void);
-
--/* updates the progressmeter to reflect the current state of the transfer */
--void refresh_progress_meter(void);
--
- /* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
- static void sig_alarm(int);
-
-@@ -120,7 +117,7 @@ format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
- }
-
- void
--refresh_progress_meter(void)
-+refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
- {
- char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
- off_t transferred;
-@@ -131,7 +128,7 @@ refresh_progress_meter(void)
- int hours, minutes, seconds;
- int file_len;
-
-- if ((!alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
-+ if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
- return;
- alarm_fired = 0;
-
-@@ -254,7 +251,7 @@ start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
- bytes_per_second = 0;
-
- setscreensize();
-- refresh_progress_meter();
-+ refresh_progress_meter(1);
-
- signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
- signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
-@@ -271,7 +268,7 @@ stop_progress_meter(void)
-
- /* Ensure we complete the progress */
- if (cur_pos != end_pos)
-- refresh_progress_meter();
-+ refresh_progress_meter(1);
-
- atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
- }
-diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
-index 8f6678060..1703ea75b 100644
---- a/progressmeter.h
-+++ b/progressmeter.h
-@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@
- */
-
- void start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
--void refresh_progress_meter(void);
-+void refresh_progress_meter(int);
- void stop_progress_meter(void);
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 80308573c..1971c80cd 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
- off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
-
- *cnt += s;
-- refresh_progress_meter();
-+ refresh_progress_meter(0);
- if (limit_kbps > 0)
- bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
- return 0;
-diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 2bc698f86..cf2887a40 100644
---- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
- {
- struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
-
-- refresh_progress_meter();
-+ refresh_progress_meter(0);
- if (bwlimit != NULL)
- bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
- return 0;
+++ /dev/null
-From 125924e47db3713a85a70e0f8d6c23818d2ea054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat, 26 Jan 2019 22:41:28 +0000
-Subject: upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
-
-remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
-
-This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
-sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
-files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
-
-For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
-
-reported by Harry Sintonen
-fix approach suggested by markus@;
-has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
-
-CVE-2019-6111
-
-Origin: backport, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
-Last-Update: 2019-02-08
-
-Patch-Name: check-filenames-in-scp-client.patch
----
- scp.1 | 12 +++++++++++-
- scp.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 0e5cc1b2d..397e77091 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
- .Sh SYNOPSIS
- .Nm scp
--.Op Fl 346BCpqrv
-+.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
- .Op Fl c Ar cipher
- .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
- .Op Fl i Ar identity_file
-@@ -208,6 +208,16 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
- The program must understand
- .Xr ssh 1
- options.
-+.It Fl T
-+Disable strict filename checking.
-+By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
-+.Nm
-+checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
-+to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
-+Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
-+filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
-+This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
-+the server will not send unexpected filenames.
- .It Fl v
- Verbose mode.
- Causes
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 1971c80cd..035037bcc 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
- #include <dirent.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <fnmatch.h>
- #include <limits.h>
- #include <locale.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-@@ -383,14 +384,14 @@ void verifydir(char *);
- struct passwd *pwd;
- uid_t userid;
- int errs, remin, remout;
--int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
-+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
-
- #define CMDNEEDS 64
- char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
-
- int response(void);
- void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
--void sink(int, char *[]);
-+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
- void source(int, char *[]);
- void tolocal(int, char *[]);
- void toremote(int, char *[]);
-@@ -429,8 +430,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
- addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
-
-- fflag = tflag = 0;
-- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1)
-+ fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
-+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
-+ "dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) {
- switch (ch) {
- /* User-visible flags. */
- case '1':
-@@ -509,9 +511,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- setmode(0, O_BINARY);
- #endif
- break;
-+ case 'T':
-+ Tflag = 1;
-+ break;
- default:
- usage();
- }
-+ }
- argc -= optind;
- argv += optind;
-
-@@ -542,7 +548,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- }
- if (tflag) {
- /* Receive data. */
-- sink(argc, argv);
-+ sink(argc, argv, NULL);
- exit(errs != 0);
- }
- if (argc < 2)
-@@ -800,7 +806,7 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
- continue;
- }
- free(bp);
-- sink(1, argv + argc - 1);
-+ sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
- (void) close(remin);
- remin = remout = -1;
- }
-@@ -976,7 +982,7 @@ rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
- (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
-
- void
--sink(int argc, char **argv)
-+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- {
- static BUF buffer;
- struct stat stb;
-@@ -992,6 +998,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- unsigned long long ull;
- int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
- char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
-+ char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
- struct timeval tv[2];
-
- #define atime tv[0]
-@@ -1016,6 +1023,17 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
- if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
- targisdir = 1;
-+ if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
-+ /*
-+ * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
-+ * the requested destination file glob.
-+ */
-+ if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
-+ fatal("strdup failed");
-+ if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
-+ *restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
-+ }
-+ }
- for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
- cp = buf;
- if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
-@@ -1120,6 +1138,9 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
- exit(1);
- }
-+ if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
-+ fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
-+ SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
- if (targisdir) {
- static char *namebuf;
- static size_t cursize;
-@@ -1157,7 +1178,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv)
- goto bad;
- }
- vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
-- sink(1, vect);
-+ sink(1, vect, src);
- if (setimes) {
- setimes = 0;
- if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0)
+++ /dev/null
-From 7a3fa37583d4abf128f7f4c6eb1e7ffc90115eab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun, 10 Feb 2019 11:15:52 +0000
-Subject: upstream: when checking that filenames sent by the server side
-
-match what the client requested, be prepared to handle shell-style brace
-alternations, e.g. "{foo,bar}".
-
-"looks good to me" millert@ + in snaps for the last week courtesy
-deraadt@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b1ce7639b0b25b2248e3a30f561a548f6815f3e
-
-Origin: upstream, https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=3d896c157c722bc47adca51a58dca859225b5874
-Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/923486
-Last-Update: 2019-03-01
-
-Patch-Name: scp-handle-braces.patch
----
- scp.c | 280 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 269 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index 035037bcc..3888baab0 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -635,6 +635,253 @@ parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp,
- return r;
- }
-
-+/* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */
-+static int
-+append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np)
-+{
-+ char **tmp;
-+
-+ if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+ tmp[(*np)] = cp;
-+ (*np)++;
-+ *ap = tmp;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern.
-+ * returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns.
-+ */
-+static int
-+find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+ int in_bracket, brace_level;
-+
-+ *startp = *endp = -1;
-+ in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
-+ for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) {
-+ switch (pattern[i]) {
-+ case '\\':
-+ /* skip next character */
-+ if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0')
-+ i++;
-+ break;
-+ case '[':
-+ in_bracket = 1;
-+ break;
-+ case ']':
-+ in_bracket = 0;
-+ break;
-+ case '{':
-+ if (in_bracket)
-+ break;
-+ if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') {
-+ /* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
-+ i++; /* skip */
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ if (*startp == -1)
-+ *startp = i;
-+ brace_level++;
-+ break;
-+ case '}':
-+ if (in_bracket)
-+ break;
-+ if (*startp < 0) {
-+ /* Unbalanced brace */
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ if (--brace_level <= 0)
-+ *endp = i;
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ /* unbalanced brackets/braces */
-+ if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket))
-+ return -1;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on
-+ * alloc failure.
-+ */
-+static int
-+emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end,
-+ int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
-+{
-+ char *cp;
-+ int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1);
-+
-+ if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) +
-+ tail_len + 1)) == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ /* Pattern before initial brace */
-+ if (brace_start > 0) {
-+ memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start);
-+ o = brace_start;
-+ }
-+ /* Current braced selection */
-+ if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) {
-+ memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start,
-+ sel_end - sel_start);
-+ o += sel_end - sel_start;
-+ }
-+ /* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */
-+ if (tail_len > 0) {
-+ memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len);
-+ o += tail_len;
-+ }
-+ cp[o] = '\0';
-+ if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) {
-+ free(cp);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded
-+ * patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array.
-+ *
-+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure.
-+ *
-+ * Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether
-+ * pattern was invalid via *invalid.
-+ */
-+static int
-+brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp,
-+ int *expanded, int *invalid)
-+{
-+ int i;
-+ int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level;
-+ int sel_start, sel_end;
-+
-+ *invalid = *expanded = 0;
-+
-+ if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) {
-+ *invalid = 1;
-+ return 0;
-+ } else if (brace_start == -1)
-+ return 0;
-+
-+ in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
-+ for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) {
-+ switch (pattern[i]) {
-+ case '{':
-+ if (in_bracket)
-+ break;
-+ brace_level++;
-+ break;
-+ case '}':
-+ if (in_bracket)
-+ break;
-+ brace_level--;
-+ break;
-+ case '[':
-+ in_bracket = 1;
-+ break;
-+ case ']':
-+ in_bracket = 0;
-+ break;
-+ case '\\':
-+ if (i < brace_end - 1)
-+ i++; /* skip */
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) {
-+ if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0)
-+ continue;
-+ /* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */
-+
-+ /* Adjust end index for last selection */
-+ sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i;
-+ if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end,
-+ sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0)
-+ return -1;
-+ /* move on to the next selection */
-+ sel_start = i + 1;
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ }
-+ if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) {
-+ *invalid = 1;
-+ return 0;
-+ }
-+ /* success */
-+ *expanded = 1;
-+ return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */
-+static int
-+brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
-+{
-+ char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL;
-+ size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0;
-+ int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0;
-+
-+ *patternsp = NULL;
-+ *npatternsp = 0;
-+
-+ /* Start the worklist with the original pattern */
-+ if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+ if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) {
-+ free(cp);
-+ return -1;
-+ }
-+ while (nactive > 0) {
-+ cp = active[nactive - 1];
-+ nactive--;
-+ if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive,
-+ &expanded, &invalid) == -1) {
-+ free(cp);
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ if (invalid)
-+ fatal("%s: invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", __func__, cp);
-+ if (expanded) {
-+ /*
-+ * Current entry expanded to new entries on the
-+ * active list; discard the progenitor pattern.
-+ */
-+ free(cp);
-+ continue;
-+ }
-+ /*
-+ * Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to
-+ * the completed list
-+ */
-+ if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
-+ *cp2++ = '\0';
-+ else
-+ cp2 = cp;
-+ if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) {
-+ free(cp);
-+ goto fail;
-+ }
-+ free(cp);
-+ }
-+ /* success */
-+ *patternsp = done;
-+ *npatternsp = ndone;
-+ done = NULL;
-+ ndone = 0;
-+ ret = 0;
-+ fail:
-+ for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++)
-+ free(active[i]);
-+ free(active);
-+ for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++)
-+ free(done[i]);
-+ free(done);
-+ return ret;
-+}
-+
- void
- toremote(int argc, char **argv)
- {
-@@ -998,7 +1245,8 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- unsigned long long ull;
- int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
- char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
-- char *src_copy = NULL, *restrict_pattern = NULL;
-+ char **patterns = NULL;
-+ size_t n, npatterns = 0;
- struct timeval tv[2];
-
- #define atime tv[0]
-@@ -1028,16 +1276,13 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
- * the requested destination file glob.
- */
-- if ((src_copy = strdup(src)) == NULL)
-- fatal("strdup failed");
-- if ((restrict_pattern = strrchr(src_copy, '/')) != NULL) {
-- *restrict_pattern++ = '\0';
-- }
-+ if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0)
-+ fatal("%s: could not expand pattern", __func__);
- }
- for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
- cp = buf;
- if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
-- return;
-+ goto done;
- if (*cp++ == '\n')
- SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
- do {
-@@ -1063,7 +1308,7 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- }
- if (buf[0] == 'E') {
- (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
-- return;
-+ goto done;
- }
- if (ch == '\n')
- *--cp = 0;
-@@ -1138,9 +1383,14 @@ sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
- run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
- exit(1);
- }
-- if (restrict_pattern != NULL &&
-- fnmatch(restrict_pattern, cp, 0) != 0)
-- SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
-+ if (npatterns > 0) {
-+ for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) {
-+ if (fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0)
-+ break;
-+ }
-+ if (n >= npatterns)
-+ SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
-+ }
- if (targisdir) {
- static char *namebuf;
- static size_t cursize;
-@@ -1299,7 +1549,15 @@ bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
- break;
- }
- }
-+done:
-+ for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
-+ free(patterns[n]);
-+ free(patterns);
-+ return;
- screwup:
-+ for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
-+ free(patterns[n]);
-+ free(patterns);
- run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
- exit(1);
- }
+++ /dev/null
-From 91b777c7064d9d91a1433a42b0bb31592388d1b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2018 16:17:42 -0300
-Subject: [PATCH] fix compilation with openssl built without ECC
-
-ECDSA code in openssh-compat.h and libressl-api-compat.c needs to be
-guarded by OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-
-Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
-index de3e64a6..ae00ff59 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
-@@ -152,7 +152,9 @@
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-+#endif
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-
- #ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
-@@ -417,6 +419,7 @@ DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
- }
- #endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 */
-
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
- void
- ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
-@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
- return 1;
- }
- #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
- #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
- void
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-index 9e0264c0..6a525f28 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-+#endif
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-
- int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
-@@ -161,6 +163,7 @@ void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
- int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
- #endif /* DSA_SIG_SET0 */
-
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
- void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
- #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */
-@@ -168,6 +171,7 @@ void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
- #ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
- int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
- #endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
- #ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
- void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
+++ /dev/null
-From edfc2e18ef069ba600c8f4632ce1e3dc94a0669a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 10:04:24 -0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix OPENSSL_init_crypto call for openssl < 1.1
-
-Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
-index 8b4a3627..590b66d1 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
-@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void)
- ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- ENGINE_register_all_complete();
-
--#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001000L
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- OPENSSL_config(NULL);
- #else
- OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS |
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