From: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 05:50:43 +0000 (+0200)
Subject: cgi-io: require whitelisting upload locations
X-Git-Url: http://git.openwrt.org/feed/routing.git;lede-17.01?a=commitdiff_plain;h=e8e481e6183a4922b2db0880a47df906fabd892f;p=project%2Fcgi-io.git

cgi-io: require whitelisting upload locations

Introduce further ACL checks to verify that the request-supplied
upload location may be written to. This prevents overwriting things
like /bin/busybox and allows to confine uploads to specific directories.

To setup the required ACLs, the following ubus command may be used
on the command line:

ubus call session grant '{
  "ubus_rpc_session": "d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e",
  "scope": "cgi-io",
  "objects": [
    [ "/etc/certificates/*", "write" ],
    [ "/var/uploads/*", "write" ]
  ]
}'

Signed-off-by: Jo-Philipp Wich <jo@mein.io>
---

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 2a734b5..5fff39f 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=cgi-io
-PKG_RELEASE:=6
+PKG_RELEASE:=7
 
 PKG_LICENSE:=GPL-2.0+
 
diff --git a/src/main.c b/src/main.c
index 2bfec62..a6ded06 100644
--- a/src/main.c
+++ b/src/main.c
@@ -263,6 +263,64 @@ postdecode(char **fields, int n_fields)
 	return (found >= n_fields);
 }
 
+static char *
+canonicalize_path(const char *path, size_t len)
+{
+	char *canonpath, *cp;
+	const char *p, *e;
+
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0')
+		return NULL;
+
+	canonpath = datadup(path, len);
+
+	if (canonpath == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* normalize */
+	for (cp = canonpath, p = path, e = path + len; p < e; ) {
+		if (*p != '/')
+			goto next;
+
+		/* skip repeating / */
+		if ((p + 1 < e) && (p[1] == '/')) {
+			p++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* /./ or /../ */
+		if ((p + 1 < e) && (p[1] == '.')) {
+			/* skip /./ */
+			if ((p + 2 >= e) || (p[2] == '/')) {
+				p += 2;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* collapse /x/../ */
+			if ((p + 2 < e) && (p[2] == '.') && ((p + 3 >= e) || (p[3] == '/'))) {
+				while ((cp > canonpath) && (*--cp != '/'))
+					;
+
+				p += 3;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+next:
+		*cp++ = *p++;
+	}
+
+	/* remove trailing slash if not root / */
+	if ((cp > canonpath + 1) && (cp[-1] == '/'))
+		cp--;
+	else if (cp == canonpath)
+		*cp++ = '/';
+
+	*cp = '\0';
+
+	return canonpath;
+}
+
 static int
 response(bool success, const char *message)
 {
@@ -417,6 +475,9 @@ data_begin_cb(multipart_parser *p)
 		if (!st.filename)
 			return response(false, "File data without name");
 
+		if (!session_access(st.sessionid, st.filename, "write"))
+			return response(false, "Access to path denied by ACL");
+
 		st.tempfd = mkstemp(tmpname);
 
 		if (st.tempfd < 0)
@@ -438,7 +499,7 @@ data_cb(multipart_parser *p, const char *data, size_t len)
 		break;
 
 	case PART_FILENAME:
-		st.filename = datadup(data, len);
+		st.filename = canonicalize_path(data, len);
 		break;
 
 	case PART_FILEMODE: