From 63c17142c865618977a540485eea7a9487a58029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felix Fietkau Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2017 12:05:09 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: merge fixes for WPA packet number reuse with replayed messages and key reinstallation Fixes: - CERT case ID: VU#228519 - CVE-2017-13077 - CVE-2017-13078 - CVE-2017-13079 - CVE-2017-13080 - CVE-2017-13081 - CVE-2017-13082 - CVE-2017-13086 - CVE-2017-13087 - CVE-2017-13088 For more information see: https://w1.fi/security/2017-1/wpa-packet-number-reuse-with-replayed-messages.txt Backport of bbda81ce3077dfade2a43a39f772cfec2e82a9a5 Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau --- package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile | 2 +- ...d-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch | 154 +++++++++++ ...lation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch | 244 ++++++++++++++++++ ...n-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch | 173 +++++++++++++ ...event-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch | 65 +++++ ...TK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch | 56 ++++ ...0-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch | 124 +++++++++ ...leep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch | 35 +++ ...multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch | 68 +++++ .../patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch | 8 +- .../hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch | 10 +- 11 files changed, 929 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch create mode 100644 package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile b/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile index 8a1f083217..0e729a83e8 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/Makefile @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk PKG_NAME:=hostapd -PKG_RELEASE:=4 +PKG_RELEASE:=5 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=http://w1.fi/hostap.git PKG_SOURCE_PROTO:=git diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2136bb9d47 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/005-hostapd-Avoid-key-reinstallation-in-FT-handshake.patch @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2017 15:15:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake + +Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame +processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids +issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing +same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and +also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed +frames on RX side. + +This issue was introduced by the commit +0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in +authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple +times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is +needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt +failed. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + +--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c ++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c +@@ -2154,6 +2154,7 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos + { + struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities ht_cap; + struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities vht_cap; ++ int set = 1; + + /* + * Remove the STA entry to ensure the STA PS state gets cleared and +@@ -2161,9 +2162,18 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos + * FT-over-the-DS, where a station re-associates back to the same AP but + * skips the authentication flow, or if working with a driver that + * does not support full AP client state. ++ * ++ * Skip this if the STA has already completed FT reassociation and the ++ * TK has been configured since the TX/RX PN must not be reset to 0 for ++ * the same key. + */ +- if (!sta->added_unassoc) ++ if (!sta->added_unassoc && ++ (!(sta->flags & WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED) || ++ !wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(sta->wpa_sm))) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); ++ wpa_auth_sm_event(sta->wpa_sm, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED); ++ set = 0; ++ } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211N + if (sta->flags & WLAN_STA_HT) +@@ -2186,11 +2196,11 @@ static int add_associated_sta(struct hos + sta->flags & WLAN_STA_VHT ? &vht_cap : NULL, + sta->flags | WLAN_STA_ASSOC, sta->qosinfo, + sta->vht_opmode, sta->p2p_ie ? 1 : 0, +- sta->added_unassoc)) { ++ set)) { + hostapd_logger(hapd, sta->addr, + HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211, HOSTAPD_LEVEL_NOTICE, + "Could not %s STA to kernel driver", +- sta->added_unassoc ? "set" : "add"); ++ set ? "set" : "add"); + + if (sta->added_unassoc) { + hostapd_drv_sta_remove(hapd, sta->addr); +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1751,6 +1751,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_m + #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */ + break; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP */ ++ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED: ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; ++ return 0; + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R_AP +@@ -3725,6 +3728,14 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_ + } + + ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) ++ return 0; ++ return sm->tk_already_set; ++} ++ ++ + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry) + { +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c +@@ -794,6 +794,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state + return; + } + ++ if (sm->tk_already_set) { ++ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX ++ * PN in the driver */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail + * most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only + * after association has been completed. This function will be called +@@ -806,6 +814,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state + + /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */ + sm->pairwise_set = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE; + } + + +@@ -1002,6 +1011,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struc + + sm->pairwise = pairwise; + sm->PTK_valid = TRUE; ++ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE; + wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm); + + buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h +@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticato + u8 *data, size_t data_len); + enum wpa_event { + WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH, +- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT ++ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED + }; + void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event); +@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_sta + int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); ++int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm); + int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry); + struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry * +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h +@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine { + struct wpa_ptk PTK; + Boolean PTK_valid; + Boolean pairwise_set; ++ Boolean tk_already_set; + int keycount; + Boolean Pair; + struct wpa_key_replay_counter { diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..71c681e29b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/006-Prevent-reinstallation-of-an-already-in-use-group-ke.patch @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:03:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key + +Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a +(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do +not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an +attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the +sequence counter associated to the group key. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -207,6 +207,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t tk_len; + }; + ++struct wpa_gtk { ++ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t gtk_len; ++}; ++ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++struct wpa_igtk { ++ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN]; ++ size_t igtk_len; ++}; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + /* WPA IE version 1 + * 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type) +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -785,6 +785,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(st + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", ++ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len); + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", +@@ -819,6 +828,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(st + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ + return 0; + } + +@@ -925,6 +937,48 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(s + } + + ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++{ ++ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); ++ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); ++ ++ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ ++ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", ++ keyidx); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, ++ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", ++ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); ++ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len); ++ if (keyidx > 4095) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), ++ broadcast_ether_addr, ++ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), ++ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ ++ ++ + static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm, + struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) + { +@@ -935,30 +989,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wp + if (ie->igtk) { + size_t len; + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; +- u16 keyidx; ++ + len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len) + return -1; ++ + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); +- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d " +- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x", +- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn)); +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", +- igtk->igtk, len); +- if (keyidx > 4095) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn), +- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) { +- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, +- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver"); +- return -1; +- } + } + + return 0; +@@ -2451,7 +2489,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm) + */ + void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid) + { +- int clear_ptk = 1; ++ int clear_keys = 1; + + if (sm == NULL) + return; +@@ -2477,7 +2515,7 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm * + /* Prepare for the next transition */ + wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL); + +- clear_ptk = 0; ++ clear_keys = 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + #ifdef CONFIG_FILS +@@ -2487,11 +2525,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm * + * AUTHENTICATED state to get the EAPOL port Authorized. + */ + wpa_supplicant_key_neg_complete(sm, sm->bssid, 1); +- clear_ptk = 0; ++ clear_keys = 0; + } + #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ + +- if (clear_ptk) { ++ if (clear_keys) { + /* + * IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if + * this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition. +@@ -2501,6 +2539,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm * + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS +@@ -3052,6 +3094,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk)); + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); + os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0)); +@@ -3124,29 +3170,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_ + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + } else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) { +- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd; +- u16 keyidx; ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; + +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); +- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); +- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2); +- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6); +- +- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid); +- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen); +- +- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)", +- igd.igtk, keylen); +- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher), +- broadcast_ether_addr, +- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn), +- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) { +- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in " +- "WNM mode"); +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); ++ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) + return -1; +- } +- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id"); +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ + diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..650bf43e91 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/007-Extend-protection-of-GTK-IGTK-reinstallation-of-WNM-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:12:24 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep + Mode cases + +This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value +separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a +corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the +GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to +detect a possible key reconfiguration. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -780,14 +780,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data { + + static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, + const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd, +- const u8 *key_rsc) ++ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep) + { + const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk; + u8 gtk_buf[32]; + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && +- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)", + gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len); +@@ -828,8 +831,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(st + } + os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf)); + +- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; +- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk, ++ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -923,7 +932,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(s + (wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher, + gtk_len, gtk_len, + &gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) || +- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc))) { ++ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0))) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "RSN: Failed to install GTK"); + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -939,14 +948,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(s + + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm, +- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk) ++ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk, ++ int wnm_sleep) + { + size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher); + u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid); + + /* Detect possible key reinstallation */ +- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && +- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) { ++ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) || ++ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len && ++ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)", + keyidx); +@@ -971,8 +984,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(s + return -1; + } + +- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; +- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ if (wnm_sleep) { ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk, ++ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len); ++ } else { ++ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len; ++ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len); ++ } + + return 0; + } +@@ -995,7 +1014,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wp + return -1; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk; +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0) + return -1; + } + +@@ -1641,7 +1660,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_ + if (wpa_supplicant_rsc_relaxation(sm, key->key_rsc)) + key_rsc = null_rsc; + +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc) || ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 0) || + wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info) < 0) + goto failed; + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); +@@ -2540,8 +2559,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm * + sm->tptk_set = 0; + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } + +@@ -3095,8 +3116,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm) + os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk)); + os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk)); + os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep)); + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk)); ++ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep)); + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R + os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey)); +@@ -3161,7 +3184,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_ + + wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)", + gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) { ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) { + os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd)); + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in " + "WNM mode"); +@@ -3173,7 +3196,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_ + const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk; + + igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2); +- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0) ++ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0) + return -1; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + } else { +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -32,8 +32,10 @@ struct wpa_sm { + int rx_replay_counter_set; + u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN]; + struct wpa_gtk gtk; ++ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep; + #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W + struct wpa_igtk igtk; ++ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep; + #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */ + + struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */ diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0f1773f29 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/008-Prevent-installation-of-an-all-zero-TK.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From: Mathy Vanhoef +Date: Fri, 29 Sep 2017 04:22:51 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK + +Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver +and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from +trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK. + +This fixes the earlier fix in commit +ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the +driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account +possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of +message 3/4. + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef +--- + +--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h ++++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h +@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk { + size_t kck_len; + size_t kek_len; + size_t tk_len; ++ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */ + }; + + struct wpa_gtk { +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -581,7 +581,6 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_ + os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + } + sm->tptk_set = 1; +- sm->tk_to_set = 1; + + kde = sm->assoc_wpa_ie; + kde_len = sm->assoc_wpa_ie_len; +@@ -686,7 +685,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st + enum wpa_alg alg; + const u8 *key_rsc; + +- if (!sm->tk_to_set) { ++ if (sm->ptk.installed) { + wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, + "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver"); + return 0; +@@ -730,7 +729,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(st + + /* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */ + os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN); +- sm->tk_to_set = 0; ++ sm->ptk.installed = 1; + + if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) { + eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL); +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ struct wpa_sm { + struct wpa_ptk ptk, tptk; + int ptk_set, tptk_set; + unsigned int msg_3_of_4_ok:1; +- unsigned int tk_to_set:1; + u8 snonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; + u8 anonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN]; /* ANonce from the last 1/4 msg */ + int renew_snonce; diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8d9bd42ace --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/009-Fix-PTK-rekeying-to-generate-a-new-ANonce.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2017 12:32:57 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce + +The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing +the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going +directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to +determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the +new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant. + +Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state +for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + +--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c ++++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +@@ -1912,6 +1912,21 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2) + } + + ++static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm) ++{ ++ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, ++ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce"); ++ sm->Disconnect = TRUE; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce, ++ WPA_NONCE_LEN); ++ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0; ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK) + { + u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN]; +@@ -2932,9 +2947,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION); + else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest) + SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2); +- else if (sm->PTKRequest) +- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); +- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { ++ else if (sm->PTKRequest) { ++ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0) ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED); ++ else ++ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART); ++ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) { + case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE: + break; + case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT: diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d6e500b11b --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/010-TDLS-Reject-TPK-TK-reconfiguration.patch @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:03:15 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration + +Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has +been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues +related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check +for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so +that behavior does not get modified. + +For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was +followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating +the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e., +ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path +and simple replay attacks are not feasible. + +As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if +the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + +--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c +@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer { + u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */ + } tpk; + int tpk_set; ++ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */ + int tpk_success; + int tpk_in_progress; + +@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_s + u8 rsc[6]; + enum wpa_alg alg; + ++ if (peer->tk_set) { ++ /* ++ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver ++ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an ++ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing ++ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must ++ * not allow that to happen. ++ */ ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR ++ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure", ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ + os_memset(rsc, 0, 6); + + switch (peer->cipher) { +@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_s + return -1; + } + ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR, ++ MAC2STR(peer->addr)); + if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1, + rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the " + "driver"); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 1; + return 0; + } + +@@ -696,7 +714,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct w + peer->cipher = 0; + peer->qos_info = 0; + peer->wmm_capable = 0; +- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; ++ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0; + peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0; + os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk)); + os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1159,6 +1177,7 @@ skip_rsnie: + wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer); + return -1; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake", + peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); + os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); +@@ -1751,6 +1770,19 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct w + } + + ++static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce) ++{ ++ int i; ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) { ++ if (nonce[i]) ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++ + static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr, + const u8 *buf, size_t len) + { +@@ -2004,7 +2036,8 @@ skip_rsn: + peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len; + peer->cipher = cipher; + +- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) { ++ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 || ++ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) { + /* + * There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained + * TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the +@@ -2020,6 +2053,7 @@ skip_rsn: + "TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce"); + goto error; + } ++ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */ + } + + #if 0 diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..13d78b8cbd --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/011-WNM-Ignore-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-without-pending-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 11:25:02 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response without pending + request + +Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep +Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the +response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the +association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when +successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of +protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c +@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp( + + if (!wpa_s->wnmsleep_used) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, +- "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used in this association"); ++ "WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Response frame since WNM-Sleep Mode operation has not been requested"); + return; + } + +@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ static void ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_resp( + return; + } + ++ wpa_s->wnmsleep_used = 0; ++ + if (wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_ACCEPT || + wnmsleep_ie->status == WNM_STATUS_SLEEP_EXIT_ACCEPT_GTK_UPDATE) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Successfully recv WNM-Sleep Response " diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..12904faf1f --- /dev/null +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/012-FT-Do-not-allow-multiple-Reassociation-Response-fram.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From: Jouni Malinen +Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 12:06:37 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames + +The driver is expected to not report a second association event without +the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this +case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same +pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues, +be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this +even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected +Reassociation Response frame. + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen +--- + +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +@@ -2568,6 +2568,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm * + #ifdef CONFIG_TDLS + wpa_tdls_assoc(sm); + #endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */ ++#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; ++#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ + + #ifdef CONFIG_P2P + os_memset(sm->p2p_ip_addr, 0, sizeof(sm->p2p_ip_addr)); +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c +@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wp + u16 capab; + + sm->ft_completed = 0; ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0; + + buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) + + 2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100; +@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct + return -1; + } + ++ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission"); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs"); + return -1; +@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct + return -1; + } + ++ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1; ++ + if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0) + return -1; + +--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h ++++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h +@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ struct wpa_sm { + size_t r0kh_id_len; + u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN]; + int ft_completed; ++ int ft_reassoc_completed; + int over_the_ds_in_progress; + u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */ + int set_ptk_after_assoc; diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch index 1403fe0f43..b4729581c4 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/380-disable_ctrl_iface_mib.patch @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static void ieee802_1x_wnm_notif_send(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx) --- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c +++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c -@@ -3544,6 +3544,7 @@ static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val +@@ -3565,6 +3565,7 @@ static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int val return val ? "TRUE" : "FALSE"; } @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d" #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \ -@@ -3688,7 +3689,7 @@ int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_mac +@@ -3709,7 +3710,7 @@ int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_mac return len; } @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ { --- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c -@@ -2252,6 +2252,8 @@ static u32 wpa_key_mgmt_suite(struct wpa +@@ -2308,6 +2308,8 @@ static u32 wpa_key_mgmt_suite(struct wpa } @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d" #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \ ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff -@@ -2335,6 +2337,7 @@ int wpa_sm_get_mib(struct wpa_sm *sm, ch +@@ -2391,6 +2393,7 @@ int wpa_sm_get_mib(struct wpa_sm *sm, ch return (int) len; } diff --git a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch index ee892e2bae..0d9aca9aa2 100644 --- a/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch +++ b/package/network/services/hostapd/patches/600-ubus_support.patch @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ if (res == HOSTAPD_ACL_PENDING) { wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Authentication frame from " MACSTR " waiting for an external authentication", -@@ -2391,7 +2405,7 @@ static u16 send_assoc_resp(struct hostap +@@ -2401,7 +2415,7 @@ static u16 send_assoc_resp(struct hostap static void handle_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt, size_t len, @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ { u16 capab_info, listen_interval, seq_ctrl, fc; u16 resp = WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS, reply_res; -@@ -2399,6 +2413,11 @@ static void handle_assoc(struct hostapd_ +@@ -2409,6 +2423,11 @@ static void handle_assoc(struct hostapd_ int left, i; struct sta_info *sta; u8 *tmp = NULL; @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ if (len < IEEE80211_HDRLEN + (reassoc ? sizeof(mgmt->u.reassoc_req) : sizeof(mgmt->u.assoc_req))) { -@@ -2518,6 +2537,13 @@ static void handle_assoc(struct hostapd_ +@@ -2528,6 +2547,13 @@ static void handle_assoc(struct hostapd_ } #endif /* CONFIG_MBO */ @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ /* * sta->capability is used in check_assoc_ies() for RRM enabled * capability element. -@@ -3025,7 +3051,7 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data +@@ -3035,7 +3061,7 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_PROBE_REQ) { @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ return 1; } -@@ -3043,17 +3069,17 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data +@@ -3053,17 +3079,17 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data switch (stype) { case WLAN_FC_STYPE_AUTH: wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "mgmt::auth"); -- 2.30.2